Reasonable Suspicion & Probable Cause

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Reasonable suspicion or often referred to as Reasonable Articulable Suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' "; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts". The training, knowledge and experience of the officer or official can be used to add credence to the suspicion. The Courts have even noted that articulating precisely what reasonable suspicion means is difficult. A phase used in several cases is “Reasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act” (Ornelas v. United States, 1996).

Probable Cause is the apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution. Probable cause for a search is that there are sufficient facts to support that evidence is likely to be at a specific place or location. 

Law enforcement officers assigned to schools MUST have probable cause to search students in school, just as they would need to outside of school. A problem arises, however, when school officials ask law enforcement to search students on behalf of the school administration or vice versa.  Which standard applies to that search: reasonable suspicion or probable cause? Currently, little case law exists on this point, though some cases have attempted to address the issue, including the following examples: 

In conclusion, an SRO or SPO must have probable cause; therefore, it is safer to have school administration do the search.

Terry Vs. Ohio U. S. Supreme Court 1963 (“Terry Stops” / “Stop and Frisk”)

Law enforcement officers may also conduct warrantless searches in several types of exigent circumstances where obtaining a warrant is dangerous or impractical. Terry v. Ohio, 1968 was a landmark decision on of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court ruled that the 4th Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when an officer stops a suspect and frisks them without probable cause to arrest, if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed/is committing/is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief the person "may be armed and presently dangerous." For their own protection, after a person has been stopped, police may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This reasonable suspicion MUST be based on "specific and articulable facts" and not merely upon an officer's hunch. This reasonable suspicion permitted police action which has subsequently been referred to in short as a "stop and frisk,"

The Terry case involved an incident that occurred on 10.31.63, in Cleveland, OH. Policeman Martin McFadden was on duty and noticed two men standing on a street corner. He watched one of the men, John W. Terry, walk down the street, stop in front of a jewelry store, look through its window, then briefly continue on before turning around and returning to the original street corner, stopping to look in the store window again on his way back. The other man, Richard Chilton, then did the same route. McFadden watched the pair repeat this routine about a dozen times, then a third man joined them and the three walked up the street together toward the store. McFadden suspected that the men were "casing" the store in preparation for robbing it, so he followed and confronted them. He asked the men's names, then patted down Terry's and Chilton's exterior clothing and discovered that they both had pistols in their jacket pockets. 

After discovering the pistols, McFadden arrested Terry and Chilton, and they were both charged with illegally carrying concealed weapons. At trial, Terry's lawyer made a motion to suppress the evidence of the discovered pistol, arguing that the "frisk" by which McFadden had discovered it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and so per the exclusionary rule the pistol should be excluded from evidence. The trial judge denied his motion on the basis that the "stop-and-frisk" was generally presumed legal, and Terry was convicted. He appealed to the Ohio District Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction, then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which dismissed his appeal. He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear his case and granted certiorari.

"searches" and "seizures" that occurred during a "stop-and-frisk" were so "limited" and "brief" that they did not require the police to have probable cause beforehand. Reasoning that police officers' need to protect themselves outweighed the limited intrusions involved, the Court ruled that officers could "stop and frisk" a person if they had "reasonable suspicion" that crime was afoot and did not need the higher level of "probable cause".

This ruling provided for a two-part action to take place. The Court stated that the "reasonable suspicion" standard must apply to both the initial stop and the frisk. First, it stated that a police officer must have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect in the first place. Second, it held that an officer could then "frisk" a stopped suspect if he or she had reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous, or if, in the officer's experience, the suspected criminal activity was of a type that was "likely" to involve weapons. The officer's "frisk" could only be for the sole purpose of ensuring the suspect was not armed, and so had to be limited to a pat-down of the suspect's outer clothing. It may be better stated that the principle of “stop and frisk” should more appropriately be referred to as “stop; and if there is reasonable suspicion, frisk.”